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THE PERIPATETIC METHOD: 
WALKING WITH WOODBRIDGE, 
THINKING WITH ARISTOTLE 
..• thinking and walking are different ways of getting about in a common world which has a make-
up agreeable to each of these ways. 
PREAMBLE 
Walking the streets of the Greenwich Village 
on a rather bitter, early January day, a year 
after defending my dissertation and months 
before receiving my first job offer, I stum-
bled upon one of those inconspicuous little 
bookstores tucked away from the bustle of 
things, just below street level. Descending 
three stairs, I entered, drawn more by the 
promise of warmth than by the hope of 
inspiration. As I made my way toward the 
Philosophy section, I was ·prepared to feel 
my reigning mood of uncertainty aug-
mented by the daunting quantity of words 
to be read, new ideas somehow to be 
digested. 
Almost immediately, I found myself 
addressed by a rather pathetic looking lit-
tle volume: it seemed to be a photocopy of 
a text, bound in plastic with a spine of burnt 
orange and nothing to identify its content. 
Pulling it from the shelf, I was at first put off 
by its announced title, Aristotle's Vision of 
Woodbridge, The Realm of Mind, 19261 
Nature, so critical as I was at the time of the 
metaphysics of vision. 
And yet, there was this name, Woodbridge, 
and another, Randall, that seemed to give the 
thing a kind of weight. Someone had taken 
care to photocopy these pages, to bind them 
together, to preserve them for posterity, per-
haps, indeed, for me. 
Plus, it only cost a dollar. 
And so it was, with a cenain hesitation, 
and yet in wonder, that I opened the book 
and began to read. 
"This small volume is offered," wrote 
Randall in the introduction, "in the convic-
tion that it is the most imponant writing on 
Aristotle's thought since the revolutionary 
study of Werner Jaeger in 1923."2 The state-
ment comes as a shock and one is tempted 
initially to dismiss it as nothing more than 
yet another one of those generous, but hyper-
bolic gestures of respect students tend to 
bestow upon their teachers. 
However, somewhere along the paths 
of thinking Woodbridge traverses in these 
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lectures, this initial impression gives way to 
the growing realization that Woodbridge, 
drawing upon his own great mentor, George 
Santayana, has indeed charted a methodo-
logical approach to Aristotle's thinking that 
surpasses that of Jaeger's developmentalism. 
Although Woodbridge offers only a rough 
topography of what I have elsewhere called 
Aristotle's peripatetic legomenology, to pur-
sue the tack Woodbridge takes in these lec-
tures is to be led back to an Aristotle who 
brings his thinking to life by allowing life to 
animate his thinking. 3 
...... 
PERIPATETIC LEGOMENOLOGY 
To say more than human things with 
human voice, 
That cannot be; to say human things with 
more 
Than human voice, that, also, cannot be; 
To speak humanly from the height or 
from the depth 
Of human things, that is acutest speech. 
Wallace Stevens, "Chocorua to 
its Neighbor"4 
These lines from Wallace Stevens articulate 
something of the spirit in which Aristotle's 
thinking unfolds; for his philosophical 
endeavor involves precisely that "acutest 
speech" that attempts "to speak humanly 
from the height or from the depth of human 
things." But as the Stevens poem itself brings 
to language, the realm "of human things" is 
bound intimately up with the realm of natu-
ral things . .1 This intimacy between human-be-
ing and natural being is at the very root of 
Aristotle's thinking. Thus, although Aristotle 
has sometimes been accused of seeking "to 
say more than human things with human 
voice," in fact, everything he says is said in an 
attempt to give voice to the nature of things.6 
The manner in which nature expresses itself 
is, for Aristotle, so deeply integrated into the 
power of human articulation that each genu-
ine attempt to articulate the truth concerning 
the nature of things touches upon something 
of that nature however ultimately elusive. 7 
The attempt to speak humanly from the 
height and depth of human things is, then, to 
embark on a path of speaking and thinking 
that uncovers something of the highest and 
deepest truths of nature itself. This is pre-
cisely the path toward which Woodbridge's 
engagement with Aristotle points; it is the 
path that Randall recognizes as on par with 
the contributions of Jaeger, but it is also a 
path so deeply rooted in Aristotle's thinking 
that it remains discernible in Jaeger's own 
developmental approach. 
In his seminal book, Aristoteles, 
Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner 
Entwicklung, Werner Jaeger shows that "at 
the root of [the Aristotelian texts], there is a 
process of development."8 His great insight 
is the recognition that Aristotle's texts give 
voice to a thinking that lives and develops. 9 
The book's appearance in 1923 might best 
be traced along a line of scholarship that 
extends back through F. A. Trendelenburg 
to Hegel, who, a century earlier, argued in 
his Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der 
Philosophie that Aristotle is not to be read 
as a "unspeculative empiricist" but rather as 
a great idealist whose thinking was alive to 
the life of thinking itself .10 If Hegel's inter-
pretation excited his students because it chal-
lenged the "the axiom defended by Locke to 
Kant up to Schleiermacher, that Aristotle was 
an unspeculative empiricist," Trendelenburg, 
challenging Hegel's own tendency to privi· 
lege pure thinking, emphasized the organic 
interaction between the human mind and 
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the environment.11 As Rosenstock puts it, 
Trendelenburg "views the role of reason 
in the context of its genesis and operation 
in nature." 12 Situating Jaeger in this tradi-
tion at once accounts for a central tension 
in his reading of Aristotle and connects him 
to a tradition that had a deep influence on 
Frederick Woodbridge. 13 
The central tension in Jaeger's work is 
between a certain tendency toward systema-
ticity and an affirmation of the living context 
in which Aristotelian thinking unfolds. The 
developmental approach to Aristotle's work 
resolves the tension beautifully by turning a 
specific biographical story about Aristotle 
into the organizing principle of his philoso-
phy. More specifically, Jaeger appeals to 
Aristotle's relationship to his teacher, Plato, 
and his alleged struggle to come to his own 
terms with the world in the shadow of Plato's 
"unlimited genius," in order to explain away 
the inconsistencies one encounters if one 
reads Aristotle's work as the articulation of 
fully developed system.14 But the develop-
mental approach, despite its great recog-
nition of the living nature of Aristotelian 
thinking, ultimately reinforced the seduc-
tion of hermeneutical consistency: it remains 
animated by an attempt to explain away the 
apparent contradictions in Aristotle's think-
ing. However, the appearing of contradiction 
is for Aristotle the very sort of diction that 
announces the presence of a matter for 
thinking. Aristotle attends to such dictions 
carefully, not as intractable contadictories, 
one side of which must be destroyed to 
allow the other to reign, but as indications 
of impasses to be navigated, oriented always 
by the beacon of the appearing of things. 15 
His is a thinking on the way. It is peripatetic, 
just as those who followed him as he walked 
the grounds of the Lyceum were called 
"peripatoi," the ones who walk. 
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Although Woodbridge does not speak of 
Aristotle's thinking as peripatetic, the great 
-insight of his own engagement with Aristotle 
is precisely this attempt to walk with him as 
he "goes directly without preliminary to the 
subject-matter involved and follows where 
it leads him."16 Like Jaege.r; Woodbridge rec-
ognizes the living dimension of Aristotelian 
thinking; but unlike Jaeger, for Woodbridge, 
the deepest expression of this living thinking is 
experienced in Aristotle's philosophical meth-
odology. Here, "methodology" speaks with 
a decidedly Greek accent: it names a way of 
following along after, meta-hodos, the logos 
of things.17 But the logos of things expresses a 
structure accessible to the powers of the human 
soul, even if our finite powers can never cap-
ture the full depth of nature's expression. John 
E. Smith at once articulates the meaning of the 
term "expression" that should be amplified 
here and emphasizes the dimension of inacces-
sibility that cannot be eclipsed: 
In any present, something is expressed 
or made manifest, but much is not 
expressed. I do not mean that the mani-
fest or surface is "appearance" and the 
depth "reality," since both are equally 
real in relation to the individual express-
ing itself; it is rather that with respect to 
the expression of any individual in any 
specific situation, there is always "more 
to come." 18 
For Smith as for Aristotle, the surface and 
the depth are part of the same reality at work 
expressing itself. Human access to the depth 
of things is, however, mediated by the power 
of human articulation that itself, as Smith 
rightly suggests, "is integral to Being." 19 Thus, 
the way to the depth of things is mediated by 
the human capacity for articulation that itself 
ought not to be understood to fundamen-
tally distort the nature of things, but rather, 
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to correspond to and with the expression of 
nature in ways that bring meaning to life. 
This sense of correspondence-Woodbridge 
speaks in terms of "cooperation," "correla-
tion" and even "conformation"-between 
the human power of articulation and the 
natural expression of things is at the root of 
Aristotle's methodological approach. 20 
In an early passage from the De Anima, 
Aristotle articulates the manner in which his 
investigation into the soul follows along after 
the things said beautifully about it: 
While inquiring concerning the soul, 
going through the impasses (diaporoun-
tas) concerning which there is a need to 
find a way (euporein) in order to move 
forward, it is at the same time necessary 
to take up along the way the opinions of 
those who came before, however many 
showed forth (arephenanto) something 
concerning the soul, in order that we 
may take hold of the things said beauti-
fully, but, if any are not said beautifully, 
that we may beware of these.21 
The peripatetic methodology is thus a legom-
enology: the things said, 'ta A.£y6µevn, open a 
path into the nature of things. In this passage 
the appearance of words related to the Greek, 
poros-road, passage, way-testifies to the 
dynamic nature of Aristotle's thinking as a 
thinking on the way. In the Physics, Aristotle 
has famously designated his way of thinking 
as a "natural road from what is more famil-
iar and clearer to us to what is more famil-
iar and clearer by nature."22 In practicing a 
peripatetic legomenology, however, Aristotle 
recognizes that this natural path to nature is 
itself made possible by the nature of language. 
Woodbridge puts it this way: 
Metaphysics thus follows and may refine 
the uses of common speech. We need not 
be metaphysicians to claim mind and 
body as our rightful possessions. For 
just as it is natural for us to speak of a 
man who walks far and lustily, as a great 
walker, and to endow him with a strong 
body, so it is natural for us to speak of 
him who thinks profoundly, as a great 
thinker, and to endow him with a great 
mind. Thus common speech condenses 
into single words meanings which require 
many sentences for their full expression. 
Such words economize speech and give 
to language its wealth of significance. 23 
From this perspective, it is unnecessary to 
posit two separate methodological appro-
aches in Aristotle, the one empirical, deal-
ing with the appearances of sense, the other, 
dialectical, dealing with the common manner 
in which people speak.24 Rather, Aristotle's 
naturalistic understanding of language roots 
the things people say in the very nature of 
things in a way that undercuts the standard 
dichotomy between naturalism and conven-
tionalism. That dichotomy is predicated on 
a conception of human-being and human 
language fundamentally uprooted from the 
world of nature.25 The wealth of signifi-
cance endemic to human language is itself 
an expression of the wealth of significance 
endemic to nature. 
Woodbridge emphasizes this deep correla-
tion between language and nature in his lec-
tures on Aristotle when he writes: 
But [Aristotle] will not let the natural-
ness of language be natural in admission 
only. He makes it natural in nature. It 
becomes one of nature's supreme prod-
ucts, the product in which all other 
products find articulated linkage. For 
things to go into language is a going, just 
as much of a going on their part, and just 
as natural, as their going into air or water, 
up or down, or from seed to flower.26 
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Thus, when Aristotle speaks, again and again, 
of how things are said, when he attends care-
fully to the various ways they are said and 
when he rehearses what others have said 
about them, his manner of speaking must be 
heard as organically bound to a way of think-
ing rooted in the natural community of com-
munication between the powers of the soul 
and things of nature. Aristotle's phenomeno-
logical attunement to the ways things express 
themselves and his assiduous attempts to get 
things said beautifully are thus two dimen-
sions of a peripatetic legomenology that 
speaks with and attends to the language 
of nature in an attempt to do justice to the 
nature of things. 
THE SURFACE OF THINGS 
It is as if being was to be observed, 
As if, among the possible purposes 
Of what one sees, is the purpose to be 
seen, 
The property of the moon, what it evokes. 
Wallace Stevens, "Note on Moonlight"27 
Peripatetic legomenology is rooted in Arist-
otle's naturalistic understanding of the rela-
tionship between the powers of the soul 
and the things with which they cooperate. 
Woodbridge puts it this way: "The correla-
tion between the powers of the soul and 
the natural conditions of their exercise is, 
perhaps, the one dominant and outstanding 
characteristic of Aristotle's psychology."28 
Yet, what Woodbridge identifies as the key to 
Aristotle's psychology, is in fact the organic 
enabling condition of Aristotelian thinking 
itself. His peripatetic legomenology is predi-
cated on the recognition that the logos at 
work in nature is also somehow at work in 
the soul. 
THE PERIPATETIC METHOD 
In DA II.5, Aristotle pursues a legomenol-
ogy of perceiving, "'to aio0aveo0ai.," in 
order to lend determination to the precise 
manner in which the power of perceiv-
ing cooperates with that which can be per-
ceived. Attending first to the things said 
about aisthesis, Aristotle identifies the limits 
of understanding perceiving in purely pas-
sive terms.29 He proceeds then to consider 
the way perceiving itself is said. The articu-
lar infinitive that designates the activity of 
perceiving, "to aio0aveo0at," speaks in the 
middle voice and so points to perceiving as 
an active condition of the soul, a hexis with 
the power to actively receive what presents 
itself in perceiving. By attending to the way 
perceiving is said, Aristotle is himself able to 
hear the manner in which perceiving is itself 
the expression of a cooperation between the 
power of the soul and the nature of the thing 
perceived. He begins by delineating the two 
ways perceiving is said: 
Since we say perceiving (to aio0aveo0aL) 
doubly (for what has the potency of hear-
ing and seeing we say hears and sees, even 
if it happens to be asleep, as well as what is 
already at-work ['to Evepyoi3v] 
seeing and hearing), so too should the 
power of perceiving be said 
doubly, on the one hand, as in potency, 
and on the other, as being-at-work; also 
similarly that which is perceived (to 
aioerit6v) is a being both in potency and 
at-work.30 
The way we speak about perceiving suggests 
something decisive about the nature of the 
phenomenon itself: namely, that it must be 
twofold. Not only is the Greek word itself 
articulated in the middle voice, suggest-
ing already that it is not simply passive, but 
we also speak about hearing and seeing as 
active powers even when they are not actively 
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at work. The cascading structure of this 
passage that moves from "'to alo0<lveo0ai.," 
to and ultimately, to "'to 
alo01ft6v" itself illustrates beautifully the 
manner in which the way we speak about 
"'to alo0<lvw0m" uncovers something of 
the truth about the power of perceiving in its 
relation to what is perceived. 
By the end of 11.5, Aristotle is thus in a 
position to recognize on the basis of his 
legomenoJogy of "'to alo0aveo0m" both the 
limits of our ways of saying things and the 
insights we gain from attending carefully to 
the ways things are said: 
But since these differences [with respect 
to the senses of potency] are with-
out names, though it has been marked 
out that they are different and how they 
are different, there is a need to use the 
words "to be acted upon" and "to be 
altered" as though they were appropriate. 
And the ability to perceive is in potency 
such as the perceived thing is already 
in its being-at-work-staying-itself 
just as has been said. So it 
is acted upon when it is not like {the per-
ceived thing], but when it has been acted 
upon (peponthos), then it has become 
likened (homoiotai) to it, and is such as 
that is.31 
Although the double nature of perceiving 
finds articulation in the ways perceiving is 
said, still, our ways of speaking about things 
do not always articulate dearly the differ-
ences heard in our ways of saying things. 
Aristotle here remains willing to use the com-
mon way of speaking about the nature of per-
ceiving as a kind of being acted upon, but he 
emphasizes the limitations of understanding 
the encounter between the power of perceiv-
ing and what is perceived in purely passive 
terms. Indeed, his own careful language-and 
here particularly his use of the perfect 
tense--gestures to the moment of perceptual 
encounter between the power of perceiving 
and what is perceived that cannot quite be 
captured in purely passive terms. The perfect 
tense-"peponthos" and "homoiotai"-ar-
ticulates the moment of perceptual encounter 
as having already happened; this Aristotle is 
forced to do here because as he himself says: 
"there is a need to use the words 'to be acted 
upon' and 'to be altered' as though they were 
appropriate." The need to use these words 
that amplify the passive dimension of per-
ceiving require Aristotle to speak in the per-
fect tense in order to give voice to the active 
side of the cooperative relationship that ena-
bles perceiving itself.32 
A legomenological reading of Aristotle 
as he himself pursues a legomenology of 
perceiving uncovers his teaching on the 
nature of perceiving as a cooperative activity 
between the power of perceiving and what is 
perceived. This teaching on the cooperative 
nature of perceptual encounter finds its cor-
relate in Aristotle's teaching on the nature of 
thinking itself. Woodbridge rightly makes the 
correlation between perceiving and think-
ing central to his own reading of Aristotle's 
account of the soul. Thus, according to 
Woodbridge, the most significant sentence 
of the DA extends the correlation between 
the powers of perceiving and the perceivable 
things with which they cooperate to what 
Woodbridge calls the realm of mind: "just as 
the power of perceiving is to that which is 
perceptible, so too is the intellect (to voilv) 
to that which is intclligible."33 Aristotle puts 
it this way in DA III.4 on the so-called pas-
sive intellect: 
[Thinking] must be unaffected (apathes) 
but capable of being receptive (dektikon) 
of the form and in potency it must not 
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be the form, but such as it is, and it must 
hold similarly lxav), with the 
result that as the ability to perceive is to 
the thing perceived, so too is thinking to 
the thing thought. 34 
Although Aristotle here speaks of think-
ing as "unaffected," he immediately refers 
to the specific capacity thinking has-it is 
"dektikon"-and indeed, to the manner in 
which it holds itself as 
lxav"-to the form in order to explain 
how thinking is itself possible. The model to 
which he gestures as he attempts to articu-
late the nature of thinking is, in fact, that of 
perceiving. 
Woodbridge emphasizes how this analogy 
between the powers of perceiving and the 
power of the intellect articulates the manner 
in which each of these natural powers of the 
soul operates in "realms of being congruent 
with their exercise."35 Thus, just as vision 
may be said to operate in the realm of the vis-
ible, intellect is said to operate in a realm of 
the intelligible. Such realms, for Woodbridge, 
are not separate worlds independent of one 
another-the one bodily, the other mental-
rather, they are different ways the natural 
world expresses itself, each of which is dis-
cernible to and by a corresponding power of 
the soul. Thus, Woodbridge writes: 
Men think and reason as well as perceive 
and take nourishment. Both are equally 
natural activities on man's part. But just 
as the taking of nourishment involves a 
field of food or food objects, so the exer-
cise of reason involves a field of ideas or 
ideal objects. In other words, the rational 
life of man is not something superim-
posed on his other lives or growing out 
of them, but is life in a realm of being 
different from theirs. Nature in its own 
right must possess such a realm of being, 
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or man could not think at all, just as he 
could not see at all if nature in its own 
· right were never visible.36 
What the mind thinks and what the eyes 
see are different aspects of the same natu-
ral world operating in what Woodbridge 
calls distinct "realms of being." But for 
Woodbridge, a "realm" does not fragment the 
integrity of the natural world. Although an 
idea can no more nourish our physical bodies 
than a carrot can feed our mind, still the idea 
and the carrot remain natural expressions of 
a natural world to which our human diges-
tive and intellectual capacities correspond. 
Even so, however, in speaking the language 
of "realms," Woodbridge risks introducing a 
chasm between the nutritive, perceptive soul 
and the intellect that is nowhere present in 
Aristotle. 37 
For Woodbridge, inquiry begins with the 
things we encounter in the world. He writes: 
"So men find rocks and trees, seas and 
stars, memories and fancies, and look to see 
what these things are and what can be said 
about them. All inquiry starts in this way 
and not with 'phenomena' or 'experience' or 
'sense-data."'38 To use the Aristotelian lan-
guage of the Metaphysics, we begin "wonder-
ing about the strange things at hand." 39 Yet 
for Aristotle, these are precisely the wholes 
"better known by perceiving" that lead 
somehow along a natural road to the nature 
of each thing.40 By insisting that these things 
we encounter are not "phenomena" or "expe-
rience" or "sense-data," Woodbridge seeks 
to emphasize that these encountered things 
are not at first encountered in philosophical 
terms. And even if this point resonates with 
Aristotle's own starting point in the world 
of common human interactions, Aristotle's 
thinking always already takes the things 
encountered themselves as phenomena; 
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not, indeed, as phenomena disjoined from 
being, but as appearances in and through 
which being expresses itself. Thus, although 
Woodbridge follows Aristotle in his attempt 
to begin with the things encountered, he nev-
ertheless parts ways with Aristotle insofar 
as he refuses to pursue the manner in which 
thinking does in fact grow somehow out of 
perceiving even if perceiving and thinking 
operate in distinct, albeit parallel, "realms." 
Spinoza, it seems, has exerted a bit too much 
influence on Woodbridge in this regard, for 
the sort of parallelism Woodbridge seems to 
advocate is more at home in Spinoza than in 
Aristotle who, despite Wood bridge's claims to 
the contrary, sought to weave perceiving and 
thinking together into the fabric of nature.41 
A PATH PHANTASTIC 
The imagination loses vitality as it ceases 
to adhere to what is real. 
Wallace Stevens42 
In The Realm of Mind, Woodbridge argues 
that walking, perceiving and thinking are 
thoroughly natural and yet also, that they 
belong to different "realms" within one 
"realm of being."43 Woodbridge is careful 
to insist that to speak of a realm of mind 
found within the realm of being is neither 
to exclude nor to devalue the other realms 
in which being expresses itself differently. 
Yet his own tendency to insist that the realm 
of mind is incommensurable with the other 
realms of being threatens the organic coher-
ence of nature. To put this in terms of the his-
tory of philosophy gestured to above, there 
remains in Woodbridge a residual segregation 
of mind and body that seems to be more the 
result of a Spinozistic response to Cartesian 
dualism than that of a genuine engagement 
with Aristotle. Although Woodbridge does 
not speak of nature as an expression of God's 
infinite attributes, two of which are thought 
and extension, nevertheless, like Spinoza, 
Woodbridge insists that thinking can be nei-
ther derived from nor reduced to the opera-
tions of the body. If Spinoza calls thinking an 
attribute of God, Woodbridge designates it 
as an operation at work in a realm of mind as 
part of the overarching realm of being. 
Yet, by introducing the spatial metaphor 
of the "realm," which itself, according to 
Woodbridge, names "neither a place nor 
an event" but rather a "region inhabited," 
Woodridge reinforces the impression that the 
life of the mind is in some fundamental way 
divorced from the life of walking and per-
ceiving. 44 This impression is augmented by 
Woodbridge's tendency to emphasize precisely 
the difference between the realms in which 
walking, perceiving, and thinking operate. 
In the Realm of Mind, for example, even as 
Woodbridge insists that thinking is also an 
embodied activity, nevertheless, he writes: "But 
when these bodies think, they do something 
incomparable with what they do when they 
walk."45 The impulse to emphasize the differ-
ence seems animated by Woodbridge's desire to 
insist that what the mind discovers by means 
of its operation is not a mere construct of the 
mind, but a genuine discovery that belongs 
to the logical structure of nature itself. 46 In 
his admirable attempt to avoid the pitfalls 
endemic to the modem conception of the con-
structive, agent mind, however, Woodbridge 
relinquishes something of Aristotle's powerful 
but difficult understanding of the life of the 
mind as organically bound up with the per-
ceiving life and the walking life. 
Although Woodbridge insists, rightly, that 
the life of the mind is not superimposed 
upon the life of perceiving and walking, and 
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further, that there is in Aristotle no evolu-
tion of the powers of the soul, still, however, 
Aristotle himself is driven to account for the 
manner in which what is given in perceiving 
is itself ultimately also given to thinking, not 
as something expressed differently in differ-
ent realms, but as something that emerges 
from or indeed grows out of our most rudi-
mentary encounters with things. This can be 
felt already in Aristotle's account of perceiv-
ing, which is said to operate at its deepest 
level both according to a certain logos and 
indeed with a kind of discerning (krinein). 47 
It can be heard in Aristotle's various attempts 
to delineate the operation of the phantasia 
or imagination as rooted in but somehow 
also different from perceiving even as it ena-
bles thinking. Somehow this community of 
powers operates according to a logos that 
belongs as much to them as to nature itself. 
Indeed, this is a community of communica-
tion, a joint accomplishment of the soul and 
the things it encounters made possible by a 
logos that lives an amphibious life, at home 
in the body as much as the mind. 
To pursue this living logos as it makes the 
passage from perceiving through imagining 
to thinking possible is a longer, more com-
plicated and yet more beautiful path than it 
is possible to take here.48 Woodbridge, how-
ever, in his 1940 book, An Essay on Nature, 
has gone some distance down the path and 
has left us the following words that trace the 
contours of a difficult itinerary: 
The only magic worth having is that 
born of a happy marriage of sense and 
intellect, the touch, not of Midas, but of 
metaphor, which so transmutes existence 
into speech that what things are and what 
they are said to be become increasingly a 
profounder intimacy with Nature. She is 
metaphor, pantomime punctuated with 
sounds, and is not out-of-doors waiting 
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to be admitted to conversation. She is 
jointly translating and translated. 49 
Aristotle's peripatetic legomenology is rooted 
in nature's metaphorical power, and one of 
nature's most powerful metaphors is the 
human imagination. If, as Aristotle says in 
the Poetics, "a good metaphor is to theorize 
things that are similar," then the phantasia 
in Aristotle is a good metaphor indeed, for 
it enables Aristotle to theorize the manner in 
which that which is encountered in perceiv-
ing nevertheless gives itself to be thought. so 
The enigmatic account of the phantasia in 
Aristotle is enigmatic precisely because it 
attempts to articulate the manner in which 
what is given in perceiving can and in fact 
does become a matter for thinking.51 To 
understand the phantasia as a metaphor is 
to theorize it as that which carries perceiv-
ings over into thinking-metapherein-thus 
enabling a passage from one dimension into 
another without either reducing thinking to 
perceiving or perceiving to thought. 
On the one hand, the phantasia in Aristotle 
is rooted in perceiving. Aristotle calls it "acer-
tain motion and not to come into being with-
out the power of perceiving." And he goes on 
to claim that "this motion would be neither 
possible without the power of perceiving nor 
present in beings that do not perceive .... "52 
On the other hand, there is no thinking 
without an appearance (phantasmatos), as 
Aristotle says repeatedly.53 As a metaphor 
in the sense suggested here, the phantasia 
is somehow capable of translating what is 
encountered in perceiving into the vernacu-
lar of thinking. In Aristotle, the metaphor 
that accounts for the metaphorical activity 
of the phantasia is that of the lever or joint. 
The intimate connection between the joint 
and articulation is heard in the Greek word 
"arthron," which means first of all, "joint," 
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but then also "to articulate," "arthroun." 54 
The joint, which for Aristotle functions like a 
lever insofar as small movements on one side 
of the fulcrum can cause greater movements 
further from the fulcrum, offers a powerful 
way to understand the manner in which two 
phenomena as different from one another as 
perceiving is from thinking can, nevertheless, 
be intimately and organically connected. The 
analogy would go something like this: just 
as the lever manifests the intimate connec-
tion between distance and weight or force, 
two phenomena that seem disparate and dis-
connected, so too, the phantasia manifests 
the intimate connection between perceiving 
and thinking. 55 That something like this is at 
work in Aristotle may be heard in this pas-
sage from the De Motu Animalium: 
But appearances (phantasia) and sense-
perceptions and ideas are ways of 
becoming-other. For on the one hand, 
sense-perceptions arise straight away, 
being a kind of becoming-other, on the 
other hand, being-appeared to (phanta-
sia) and thinking (noesis) have the power 
of the things t<i>v :rcpayµatrov ... 
Mvaµtv). For the form (eidos) that is 
thought of [the warm or cold] or pleas-
ant or fearful happens to be in some 
way like each of the things themselves; 
and because of this those who are just 
thinking [these things] shudder and are 
frightened. All these things are affections 
(pathe) and ways of becoming-other. 
And when body parts become-other, 
some become larger, some smaller. It is 
not unclear, then, that a small change 
generated in the origin produces great 
and numerous differences at a distance-
just as, if the rudder is briefly shifted, a 
great shift of the prow is generated. 56 
The example of the rudder illustrates the 
point that small shifts close to the fulcrum 
can widely alter the course of the ship. In this 
passage, Aristotle connects the phenomena of 
the rudder, which functions here on the lever 
principle, with the origins of perceiving, being 
appeared to (phantasia) and thinking in the 
things encountered in the world. Indeed, it is 
the power of the things themselves that moves 
us to shudder and be frightened not only when 
we perceive them but also when we imagine 
or think them. The vitality of the imagination 
and the life of thinking itself is rooted in the 
power of things expressing themselves. 
Ultimately however, it is not simply, as the 
above passage suggests, the form or look, the 
eidos, of things that is taken up by perceiving, 
imagining, and thinking, but the logos express-
ing itself in and through the eidos that enables 
the cooperative connection between the pow-
ers of the soul and the power of things to move 
us in certain ways. This logos too is at work 
in the things encountered in perceiving, and 
it can be translated by the imagination into 
the vernacular of thinking precisely because it 
belongs to things as an expression of nature 
itself. To borrow from Woodbridge, perhaps 
it might be said this way: for things perceived 
to go into thinking is a going, just as much of 
a going on their part, and just as natural, as 
their going into air or water, or up or down, 
or from seed to flower, or, indeed, for a winter 
walk in the city. Thus, by attending to the logos 
of things, Aristotle's own imaginative thinking 
is able to chart a path to a profounder inti-
macy with nature in which the things said are 
heard to give voice to the nature of things. 
...... 
POSTAMBLE 
The longer, more difficult and more beau-
tiful path toward which I point here but 
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cannot follow further in this chapter has 
been marked by the words and poetry of 
Wallace Stevens. Stevens' writing gives 
voice to the recognition at the root of 
Aristotle's peripatetic legomenology and 
Woodbridge's naturalism: human-being is 
at home in nature even if nature remains 
always also alien to us. Stevens emphasizes 
the connection between human-being and 
natural being by focusing on the power of 
the imagination: " ... absolute fact includes 
everything that the imagination includes. 
This is our intimidating thesis."57 The the-
sis, however intimidating, implies that even 
the human imagination must be experi-
enced as a way, perhaps as an extraordinar-
ily powerful way, nature expresses itself. 
The thesis may indeed be intimidating 
precisely because it requires us to consider 
the degree to which we are bound inti-
mately up with-now to use Woodbridge's 
words-the "whole vast scheme of things," 
which "seems to be engaged in expressing 
what it is." 58 
The dialogue between the guitarist and his 
audience that opens Stevens' poem "The Man 
with the Blue Guitar" suggests the depth of 
the human connection with the things that 
are, even as it articulates the impossibility of 
reducing the reality of things to our attempts 
to articulate them well: 
The man bent over his guitar, · 
A shearsman of sorts. The day was green. 
They said, "You have a blue guitar, 
You do not play things as they are." 
The man replied, "Things as they are 
Are changed upon the blue guitar." 
And they said then, "But play, you must, 
A tune beyond us, yet ourselves, 
A tune upon the blue guitar 
Of things exactly as they are."59 
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Play, we must, a tune beyond us, yet our-
selves: this indeed articulates something of 
the path along which Aristotle's thinking 
unfolds. And if the tune he plays attempts 
assiduously to say things exactly as they are, 
we too must recognize that things as they are 
are changed upon the blue guitar, not indeed 
by being rendered other than what they are; 
but rather, things are exactly what they are 
in relational dialogue with the things they 
encounter. One path toward this recognition 
was marked for me on that bitter January 
day when I encountered a strangely bound 
burnt orange volume on a walk through the 
streets of Greenwich Village. 
NOTES 
1 See Woodbridge, 1926. 
2 Ibid., xvi. 
Christopher P. Long 
3 The idea of a phenomenology of the things 
said is developed in Long, 2006. The term, 
"legomenology," however, was introduced first 
in an essay on Aeschylus and Hesiod as a way to 
articulate the methodological approach to read-
ing the Theogony and the Oresteia. See, Long, 
2007, 68. 
4 See Stevens, 1997, 266-7. 
5 Gyorgyi Voros mentions "Chocorua to Its 
Neighbor" when he speaks both about the 
degree to which Stevens "joyfully affirms 
human nature, while allowing nonhuman 
Nature its own integrity and domain" and, 
later in his life, "more and more sang of a self 
subsumed under a greater natural order." See 
Voros, 1997, 113, 151-2. 
6 For one poignant example, see Dewey, 1958, 
48. For a more detailed discussion of Dewey's 
misreading of Aristotle and of why Dewey, of 
all people, should have known better, see Long, 
2011, 15-19. 
7 A passage from book II of the Metaphysics, 
993a30-b3, emphasizes at once the accessibil-
ity and the elusiveness of the nature of things. 
For a discussion of this passage, see Long, 
2011, 50-6. 
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8 See Jaeger, 1923, 5. The translation is my own. 
9 Ibid., 4. The formulation seems to have been 
borrowed from Goethe. 
10 Hegel thus writes in typical fashion: "The 
Platonic is the objective in general, but the 
Jiving principle, the principle of Subjectivity is 
missing; and the Jiving principle, Subjectivity, 
not in the sense of an accidental and merely 
particular Subjectivity, but rather pure 
Subjectivity is proper to Aristotle." See Hegel, 
1986, vol. 19, 153. 
11 Michelet reports that the students in Hegel's 
seminars on Aristotle were eager to hear this 
new, living Aristotle. See, Michelet, 1837, 
686. 
12 See Rosenstock, 1964, 20. 
13 Trendelenburg is the connection between 
Woodbridge and Jaeger. As Suzanne Marchand 
notes: "Upon Jaeger's induction into the 
Prussian Academy of Sciences in 1924, 
Gustav Roethe claimed that the philosophi-
cally oriented philologist represented a link 
to the tradition of Schleiermacher and 
AdolfTrendelenburg as well as an unswerv-
ing defender of text-critical accuracy." See 
Marchand, 2003, 320. Woodbridge's own 
interest in Aristotle was cultivated during 
the period he spent in Berlin studying with 
Friedrich Paulsen. See, Lachs and Talisse, 2008, 
345. In his book on the character and develop-
ment of German Universities, Paulsen speaks 
in compelling and personal terms of the way 
Trendelenburg, "the restorer of Aristotelian 
philosophy," gave "his pupils heart for the 
study of Aristotle." See, Paulsen, 1895, 69, 147. 
There is, then, an important line of scholarship 
stemming from Trendelenburg that connects 
American pragmatic naturalism to 
a German philosophical and philological 
tradition that includes not only Jaeger but 
also Dilthey, Brentano, and Heidegger. The 
American tradition of naturalism can be traced 
from Trendelenburg to Paulsen to Woodbridge, 
George Santyana and George Sylvester 
Morris, and thus to Dewey and John Herman 
Randall. For its part, the philological side of 
the German tradition might be traced from 
Trendelenburg to Wilamovitz and Hermann 
Diel• to Jaeger, while on the phenomenologi-
cal side it might be traced from Trendelenburg 
to Dilthey, Brentano, and Heidegger. For an 
attempt to bring the tradition of American 
naturalism back into dialogue with German 
phenomenology via a reading of Aristotle that 
is informed by that German tradition of close 
philological attention, see Long, 2011. 
14 See Jaeger, 1923, 11. There is no question that 
Aristotle was influenced by Plato and, indeed, 
that their relationship must have been a pro-
found and perhaps, at times, a tense one. The 
issue is that reading Aristotle in the shadow of 
Plato eclipses the extent to which Aristotle, as 
Woodbridge insisted, sought always to address 
and pursue the things at hand (Met. I.1, 
982b13). 
15 Joseph Owens draws upon precisely this rec-
ognition of the important role such impasses 
or aporiai play in Aristotle's thinking in his 
seminal study of Aristotle's Metaphysics. See 
Owens, 1978. 
16 See Woodbridge, 1965, 17. 
17 See Long, 2011, 6-8. 
11 Smith, 1971, 599. 
19 Ibid., 605. The difference between expression 
and articulation is important. Articulation, 
following Smith, "means the making of 
something distinct so that it stands out as 
an identifiable unit with its parts arranged 
in significant patterns. On the other hand, 
articulation means that the manner of 
making something distinct requires its being 
set in precise relations to other things. The 
term, therefore, focuses attention on what is 
individual and on the fact of its belonging to a 
system or world at the same time." Ibid., 602. 
For a more detailed discussion of expression 
and articulation, see Long, 2011. 
20 Woodbridge writes: "The correlation is ... 
between an act and a field of action, and an 
act and a field of action are as different as can 
be, but it is only the cooperation of the two 
that is ever effective. The effect of this correla-
tion in operation is the 'conformation' of the 
soul to what is perceives." See Woodbridge, 
1965, 46. 
21 See De Anima 403b20-4. All translations are 
my own. 
22 See Physics 184a16-8. For a further discussion 
of Aristotle's path of inquiry in relation to the 
things said, see Long, 2006, 253-9. See too, 
Long, 2011, 1-20, 49-71. 
23 See Woodbridge, 1926, 6. 
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See Irwin, 1988, 29-30. John Cleary argues the 
case for a unified methodological approach in 
Aristotle along the lines of the legomenology 
developed here. See Cleary, 1994. 
25 Deborah Modrak calls the traditional 
dichotomy into question when she insists that 
Aristotle advocates a conventionalism with 
respect to the relationship between phoneme 
and meaning and a naturalism with respect to 
the relationship between meaning and refer-
ence. See Modrak, 2001, 19. 
26 See Woodbridge, 1965, 24. 
27 Stevens, 1984, 449. 
28 Woodbridge, 1926, 45. 
29 DA 416b32-417a9. 
30 DA 417a10-14. 
31 DA 418a1-6. The translation of entelecheia as 
"being-at-work-staying-itself" is drawn from 
Joe Sachs. See Sachs, 2001. 
32 For another example of the use of the perfect 
tense to gesture to that moment of transforma-
tion that is difficult to articulate, see the discus-
sion of praxis in Met. IX.6, in which Aristotle 
speaks of complete actions as actions in which 
we can say, at once, the same thing is seeing 
and has seen, or is thinking and has thought. 
Met. IX.6, 1048b30-5. For a discussion of that 
passage along lines similar to those pursued 
here, see Long, 2004, 98-103. 
33 See Woodbridge, 1965, 136, 45-6. Woodbridge 
calls this an "algebraic sentence," but it is 
more geometric than algebraic insofar as, on 
Woodbridge's own account, it establishes an 
analogy between terms that are correlated 
without being connected. 
DA Ill.4, 429a15-18. 
35 See Woodbridge, 1965, 46. 
36 Ibid., 47. 
37 To be sure, Aristotle distinguishes between 
various parts of the soul, but he thinks of 
these "parts" most often in terms of capaci-
ties or powers that may best be articulated 
in terms of various dimensions of the soul 
as opposed to segregated parts. Aristotle 
articulates the various dimensions of the 
soul, for example, in DA 11.2, by talking 
about the various senses in which we speak 
about living: "thinking, perceiving, motion 
and stasis with respect to place, and the 
motion that results from nourishment, that is, 
perishing and growth." DA 413a23-5. In II.3, 
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he speaks more explicitly of the "powers of 
the soul" (Trov l>E bvvaµewv tij; 1jlvxij;) as he 
delineates its nutritive, perceptive, locomotive 
and deliberative capacities (DA 414a29-32). 
To be fair, Woodbridge himself argues 
eloquently against the modern tendency to 
divorce the mind from the body. In his 1926 
book, The Realm of Mind, Woodbridge 
draws on precisely this vision of nature in 
order at once to critique and explain the 
origins of the modern dichotomy between 
mind and body. There he shows how the 
modern assumption that the mind is an agent 
separable from but operating with the body, 
specifically the brain, leads to the notion that 
the immediate objects of the mind are "nerv-
ous processes in the brain." But, he argues, 
this is patently untrue for although the tree 
may stimulate a brain, what the mind thinks 
is not these brain processes, but the tree. The 
recognition that the idea of the tree is differ-
ent from the processes of the brain leads, on 
the assumption of the mind as agent, to the 
positing of a dichotomy between mind and 
body. See Woodbridge, 1926, 13-15. 
38 See Woodbridge et al., 1937, 163. 
39 Met. 982b13-14. 
"" Phys. 184a31-3. 
41 Spinoza recognizes thinking and corporeality 
as two attributes of God's infinite substance. 
This leads to a strict parallelism between ideas 
and things as expressed clearly in Ethics, book 
II, proposition VII: "The order and connection 
of ideas is the same as the order and connec-
tion of things." See Spinoza, 1985. 
42 Stevens, 1997, 645. 
43 Woodbridge, 1926, 35. 
44 Ibid., 29, 34. 
45 Ibid., 137. Emphasis added. 
46 Woodbridge writes: "If, however, our thinking 
is to be wise and sane and correct, it is not 
the body which makes it so, but a genuine 
coherence among the things we think about. It 
is something we discover. We discover, that is, 
that there is in the realm of being a structure 
by virtue of which one fact or event in it may 
lead our thinking on to other facts and events 
what are involved, and opens us to the reaches 
of space and time and what they contain. This 
structure cannot be described as physical. It is 
logical." Ibid., 46. 
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• 7 In an unpublished 1973 paper entided 
"Aristotle on the Ontology of the Senses," 
John M. Cooper traces the connection between 
aisthesis and krinein in order to account 
for the active dimension of perceiving in 
Aristode. I am grateful to Professor Cooper 
for sending me a copy of this paper. See, 
Cooper, 1973. For a detailed discussion of the 
role of krinein in Aristotle's account of aisthi 
sis, see Long, 2011, 127-31. There 
are a number of important passages in which 
Aristotle introduces the capacity to discern-
krinein--into the logic of perceiving. See, 
for example, DA Il.10, 422a20-1, ill.2, 
425b20-2, 426b12-14, and 426b17-22; 
in Parts of Animals, Aristotle insists that ani-
mals too can discern the pleasant in what 
they taste. See, Parts of Animals 678b8-9. 
• 3 This is, in fact, the longer path that was pur-
sued in Chapters 4 and 5 of Long, 2011. 
• 9 See Woodbridge, 1940, 242. 
50 Poetics 1459a7-8. 
51 The nature of the phantasia in Aristotle has 
given rise to a long tradition of rich scholar-
ship. In calling it a metaphor here, the intent 
is decidedly not to suggest that, as Philoponus 
has insisted, the phantasia is that which 
"carries off from things that are and constructs 
a representation of that which is not, for 
instance a centaur." See, Philoponus, 
2000, 497, 24-6. Rather, metaphor here draws 
on the original Greek meaning of "meta-
pherein," to carry from one place to 
another. 
s2 DA m.3, 428b10-19. 
53 See, DA fil.7, 431a16-17 and ill.8, 
432a13-14. Freudenthal suggests that the 
difficulties associated with interpreting 
the meaning of the phantasia in Aristotle result 
from its position between perceiving 
and thinking. See, Freudenthal, 1863, 53. 
Wedin has suggested, to name only one scholar 
who has taken up the question of the 
phantalia as situated between perceiving and 
thinking in a serious way, that the phantasia 
ought not be understood as a "full fledged 
faculty" at all, but rather, it should be under-
atood to serve the full faculties of aisthisis and 
nolsis. See Wedin, 1988, 46-52. For a detailed 
discuuion of these issues, see Long. 2011, 
79-89. 
54 &p6f>ov, 't6, see Liddell, 1968. For a discussion 
of this connection, see Whitney, 1981. 
55 For a discussion of the "lever principle" on 
which this analogy depends, see De Groot, 
2008,46. 
56 See Nussbaum, 1985, 701b16-23. For a 
justification of the translation of phantasia as 
"being appeared to," see Long, 2011, 82. See 
too, Lycos, 1964. 
57 Stevens, 1951, 61. For a detailed discussion of 
this passage, see Critchley, 2005, 53-4. 
58 Woodbridge, 1926, 62. 
59 Stevens and Stevens, 1984, 133. 
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